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PREFACE
On June 26–28, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Center for
Middle East Public Policy (CMEPP) at the RAND Corporation held their sixth annual
conference in Gstaad, Switzerland. The conference was devoted to a dialogue on “The
Middle East: Changing Strategic Environment.” This report summarizes the main issues
discussed at the conference.
The RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy is part of International Programs
at the RAND Corporation, which aims to improve public policy by providing
decisionmakers and the public with rigorous, objective research on critical policy issues
affecting the Middle East.
For more information on the RAND Center for Middle East Public Policy, contact
the Director, David Aaron. He can be reached by e-mail at David_Aaron@rand.org; by
phone at 310-393-0411, extension 7782; or by mail at RAND, 1776 Main Street, Santa
Monica, California 90407-2138. More information about RAND is available at
www.rand.org.

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The Middle East: The Changing Strategic Environment
F. Stephen Larrabee
GCSP/RAND Annual Conference
Gstaad, June 26–28, 2005
On June 26–28, the Geneva Centre for Security Policy (GCSP) and the Center for
Middle East Public Policy (CMEPP) at the RAND Corporation held their sixth annual
conference in Gstaad, Switzerland. The conference was devoted to a dialogue on “The
Middle East: Changing Strategic Environment.” This report summarizes the main issues
discussed at the conference.
The Peace Process, Democracy, and Stability
The opening session of the conference was devoted to a discussion of democracy and
stability in Syria, Jordan, Lebanon, Turkey, Palestine, and Israel.
Jordan. Jordan is facing a double transition: from war to peace and from autocracy to
partial democracy. The new prime minister is an academic, but the real power behind the
throne is the foreign minister. More Palestinians, it was noted, are moving into positions
of power. This is leading to an intensification of the struggle for power between
Jordanians and Palestinians. The king wants to give the impression of change. He
continues to hold absolute power but is willing to consult more.
Jordan faces several challenges. Economically, the country is dependent on
outside aid. The spoils system is growing and becoming harder to manage. Politically,
liberalization has run aground. In foreign affairs, U.S. policy poses a challenge. The king
is worried that the United States is trying to push Jordan too far, too fast. He also fears
the knock-on effect of developments in Lebanon.
Several issues, it was suggested, are likely to be critical in the future:
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• How should the economy be reformed?
• How much power is the monarchy willing to cede?
• How can Jordan accommodate U.S. pressures for change?
• What role will the Palestinians have?
• Can Jordan reconcile with Iraq?
The crisis in the past few months has raised serious questions about the king’s
leadership. The king’s brother, the crown prince, is an attractive alternative candidate for
the throne. If the current crisis intensifies, the succession issue could reemerge.
Lebanon/Syria. Lebanon also faces important pressures for change. But where these
pressures will lead is unclear. It is possible that they could lead to something new. But
they could also lead to a new form of foreign domination. The Syrian effort to extend
Lahoud’s mandate has been the catalyst for a spontaneous challenge to Syrian
dominance. The challenge was sparked by popular discontent at the grassroots level and
reflected a desire for transparency, less corruption, and a longing for a better standard of
living.
In many ways, the political deck is being reshuffled. The power of the Security
Services is being challenged. The power of old players is diminishing, and new actors are
entering the political arena. As a result, new configurations of power are emerging. But it
is unclear what many of these groups really want. The desire for change is strong, but
whether the opposition can organize a cohesive reform movement is an open question.
Hezbollah is also undergoing change. It realizes that it has to move from being an
armed resistance movement in the South to a political movement reflecting the Shiites.
But it wants to avoid the impression that it is changing under U.S. pressure. Hezbollah is
not seen by most Lebanese as a radical movement. In Lebanon, it has a positive image
and is respected for getting Israel out of Lebanon.
As for Syria, it realizes that a big crunch is coming and that it has to change. Syria
will become a net importer of oil in five years. However, the quality of the Syrian
leadership is very low. Basher Assad lacks his father’s drive and leadership skills,
although he is beginning to put non-Baathists and some of his own people in place.
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Syrians are also beginning to challenge their leaders and the Security Services. This is an
important change. Syria will open up, which will have an inevitable impact on Lebanon.
Turkey. Turkey, it was argued, faces a period of increasing difficulty, both internally and
externally. The period since the December 17 decision by the EU to open accession
negotiations with Ankara has been characterized by increasing drift. Three issues in
particular are cause for concern.
First, relations with the EU have been complicated by the slowdown in reform.
Turkey’s AKP government seems to be drifting and unsure how to proceed in the wake
of the December 17 decision to open accession negotiations. Relations with the EU have
been further complicated by the French and Dutch rejection of the EU constitution. The
French and Dutch votes made clear that there is considerable popular discontent with the
process of enlargement. Moreover, Germany’s CDU/CSU party—which is opposed to
Turkish membership in the EU—seems likely to win the September 2005 elections. As a
result, Turkish chances of joining the EU—already uncertain prior to the French and
Dutch votes—now seem even less certain.
Second, relations with the United States remain strained since the March 1, 2003,
parliamentary vote rejecting the U.S. request to use Turkish territory to open a second
front against Iraq. Relations have been complicated by differences over Iraq, especially
the increasing “Kurdization” of Kirkuk, and the refusal of the United States to play a
more active military role in combating the Kurdistan Workers Party, which continues to
make cross-border attacks on Turkish territory from sanctuaries in Northern Iraq. These
differences have been given added impetus by the U.S. effort to portray Turkey as a
“model” for the Islamic countries in the Middle East. Many members of the Turkish elite,
especially the military, have strong misgivings about such an effort, fearing that it could
strengthen Islamic forces in Turkey and weaken Turkey’s ties to the West.
Third, there has been a perceptible rise in nationalism in Turkey over the past few
years. This has been dramatized in particular by the strong public reaction to the burning
of the Turkish flag by several youths in the spring of 2005. Some suggested that the rise
of nationalism reflects a growing sense of isolation and insecurity in Turkey, which was
worrying to many Western officials.
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There was no clear consensus among participants, however, on how serious the
problems are. One view held that the situation today is not as bad as it was during the late
1960s and early 1970s, when Turkey had faced significant domestic unrest. This view
was contested by one participant, who argued that U.S Turkish relations are more
seriously strained than many assume. He pointed in particular to a speech in April 2005
by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff General Hilmi Ozkok in which Ozkok openly
criticized American policy. Such open criticism is unusual and reflects the growing
disenchantment of the military—normally the most pro-American force in Turkey—with
U.S. policy, particularly toward Iraq. He also noted that there has been a disturbing
growth of anti-Americanism among the Turkish public.
These differences, however, appeared to be more differences of degree rather than
major substantive disagreements. On the whole, participants agreed that Turkey’s
relations with the United States and the EU—especially the latter—are likely to remain
strained and that developments in Turkey deserve close monitoring.
Palestine/Israel. Palestinian-Israeli relations seem to be entering a new, somewhat
uncertain phase. An important shift has taken place within the Palestinian community.
For years there had been a consensus within the Palestinian community that a negotiated
settlement was possible. This assumption, it was suggested, is now under challenge.
There has been a movement away from an emphasis on a comprehensive solution toward
a partial solution. The “Roadmap” had been based on the premise that the hard issues
should be negotiated after Palestinian statehood was achieved. Now the comprehensive
approach has been disaggregated. Palestinian statehood has been pulled out of the
comprehensive approach.
Moreover, the Palestinian Authority seems to be collapsing. Whatever his faults,
Arafat had been able to hold everything together. Abu Mazan was elected on a law and
order platform, but he is widely perceived as having failed to provide law and order.
Cooperation between Fatah and Hamas has deteriorated. In fact, Abu Mazan can point to
few successes in his first hundred days. The Gaza withdrawal is regarded by most
Palestinians as having more disadvantages than advantages. It reflects Sharon’s belief
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that a negotiated settlement is unattainable and/or undesirable and that the Palestinian
side is unable to deliver. Sharon has also moved away from a two-state solution.
Under these circumstances, it was argued, there appear to be four options:
• Parallel unilateralism
• A shift from emphasis on national rights to civic rights
• A new territorial configuration
• A return to Intifada.
On the Israeli side, Sharon, it was argued, has been largely successful in
overcoming opposition to disengagement. However, there are several open issues:
• How fast will the withdrawal be?
• What will be the level of cooperation between Israel and Palestine during
the withdrawal?
• Will the withdrawal lead to violence?
Early elections in Israel seem likely. Sharon, it was suggested, will probably
move to the right. He will not want to pursue negotiations after withdrawing from Gaza.
However, the Israeli political system has begun to manifest important structural
weaknesses, which are becoming increasingly evident. The electoral system does not
really function. As a result, public dissatisfaction with the electoral system is growing.
But there is no real interest in changing the system because it would hurt entrenched
interests. The economy is growing, but the fruits of this prosperity are not really shared
by the majority of the population.
One of the problems is that there is no unified view on what would constitute a
two-state solution. The concept means different things to different people. During the
conference, the role of outside powers received considerable attention. However, there
was no clear consensus among the participants as to what role outside powers can or
should play. Several participants argued that the United States should become more
actively engaged in the peace process. However, many doubted that this would happen.
Others suggested that there was little that outside powers can do because the conditions
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for a settlement do not exist unless the United States leans heavily on Israel—which few
thought was likely to happen.
Several participants lamented the lack of an active role by the Arab states. The
Saudi initiative had seemed to suggest that the Arab world was ready to play a more
active role in the search for peace. But the initiative has largely become a dead letter. The
Arab world, one participant noted, is now under stress and is not open to new ideas at the
moment.
Iraq
The situation in Iraq was a major focal point of discussion at the workshop. There was a
general consensus that despite American efforts to date to create stability, Iraq lacks a
strong and stable government that is capable of providing security. State authority, one
participant argued, is collapsing and being replaced by localism. The government in
Baghdad has problems extending its power much beyond the Green Zone. The security
situation, however, differs in various parts of the country. The Kurdish area in the North
is quite stable. The most unstable area is the Sunni Triangle.
The security situation has deteriorated over the last few months. There had been a
decline in violence in March and April, but since then the insurgents had regrouped.
However, the insurgent movement is not a tightly knit organization with a hierarchal
structure. It is composed of three groups: former Baathists and supporters of Sadaam;
foreign Jihadists; and criminals. These groups are only loosely connected with no unified
core, making the insurgency difficult to defeat.
There was a strong sense among participants that the US policy of “Iraqization” is
not working. The most effective Iraqi force is the army, but the police are not very
capable. The problem with the police, one participant noted, is not a lack of personnel,
but their lack of effectiveness. Another participant argued that it will take at least five
years before the Iraqis will be capable of providing for their own security without
American assistance.
Few participants, however, believed that the United States would be willing to
keep over 100,000 troops in Iraq that long. The tide of U.S. public opinion has begun to
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turn against the war. Even some members of Bush’s own party are beginning to call for a
gradual withdrawal of U.S. troops. The pressures for a phased withdrawal, one
participant argued, are likely to grow over the next year, forcing the administration to
begin withdrawing some troops. He cited five sources of pressure for a phased
withdrawal:
• The possibility of a new crisis (Iran, North Korea) which requires the
United States to focus its attention away from Iraq
• Growing economic pressures as a result of rising oil prices
• Rising discontent within the Republican party as the midterm elections
approach
• The possibility of a “Tet Offensive–like” event that catches the United
States by surprise and has a devastating political-psychological effect on
the U.S. public
• Rising discontent within the U.S. military about the effects of over-
extension on the military’s ability to carry out other missions.
Taken together, these developments, he argued, would force the Bush
administration to begin to draw down U.S. forces before the midterm elections.
There was strong feeling among many participants that there are no good short-
term options and that it will be difficult to turn the situation in Iraq around. As one
participant noted, the insurgents do not have to defeat the United States; they “just have
to not lose to win.” Solutions that might have worked at one point had been rejected. By
the time they were resurrected, it was too late. The internal dynamics have changed.
The Europeans, one European participant noted, are divided. On the one hand,
many are happy that the United States is bogged down in Iraq; this allows Europe to
portray itself as the “good guy” in the Middle East. On the other hand, they do not want
the United States to withdraw precipitously because this could have a destabilizing
impact not only on Iraq but on the whole Middle East.
There was a strong sense among participants that Iran will be an important player
in the future. U.S. policy, however, largely leaves Iran out of the equation. This is a
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mistake, several participants argued, because Iran will end up playing the role of a
spoiler.
Iran’s Nuclear Program
Iran’s nuclear policy was also a central theme at the workshop. Europe’s role in trying to
prevent Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons received particular attention. European
involvement was seen as motivated by several factors:
• The desire to overcome the divisions precipitated by the Iraq crisis
• The desire to play a more prominent role in preventing nuclear
proliferation
• The development of an Iranian ballistic missile program
• The strategic consequences for the Middle East of an Iranian nuclear
bomb
• The impact of an Iranian nuclear bomb on the nuclear Non-Proliferation
Treaty (NPT) regime.
In the discussions between the European troika (France, Germany and Great
Britain) and Iran, two agreements had been reached. The first was in October 2003; the
second was in November 2004. Both agreements targeted the suspension of the fuel
cycle, but the second was more precise and comprehensive. The first agreement, which
collapsed in June 2004, opened a long discussion about the perimeter of the suspension.
The second agreement banned not only any conversion, enrichment, and reprocessing but
also any assembling and testing of centrifuges.
Economically, one European participant pointed out, Iran’s fuel cycle activities
make no sense (since there is only one reactor, built by Russia, with fuel provided for 10
years), but militarily they make great sense. Moreover, Iran has been engaged in a policy
of concealment and obfuscation for roughly 20 years. Past Iranian concealment has
included acquisitions (nuclear materials and equipment), sites (Kalaye, Natanz, Arak,
Lashkar Abad, Lavizan-Shian, Parchin), and activities (conversion into uranium metal,
production of beryllium and polonium). In February 2003, the IAEA demanded full